Hello Don, Which all registries are allowed to register mix of scripts domain while registering an IDN. I checked .pyc (Cyrillic) and .भारत (Devanagiri) do not allow mix of scripts. I think we address those registries through ICANN by modifying the registry agreement, major problem can be solved. Thanks. Dr. Ajay DATA | Founder & CEO Get email id like अजय@डाटा.भारत in your own language,visit www.xgenplus.com From: "Tan Tanaka,Dennis via UA-discuss" MailId : [68456683]To: Don Hollander ,"ua-discuss@icann.org" Subject: Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concernsDate: 25 Apr 2017 06:28:22 PM v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML)} o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML)} w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML)} .shape {behavior:url(#default#VML)} Don, my comments enclosed Thanks -Dennis From: on behalf of Don Hollander Date: Monday, April 24, 2017 at 5:40 PM To: "UA-discuss@icann.org" Subject: [EXTERNAL] [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concerns Further to recent discussion on this list, we have drafted a document that we plan on posting as a Blog Post to the UASG Web site that can be referenced by others . We want to get feedback from the community on this document by Thursday UTC . So, here it is &ndash pasted below and as a word document in case you want to enable tracking and make amendments. If you have comments or suggestions, please share them to this group . Don IDNs and Phishing: What You Need to Know By TBD at UASG Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) are growing in popularity, a testament to their role in the expansion of the global Internet and the value they provide in connecting non-English speakers to the Web. However, you may have noticed a renewed focus over the past week of a script mixing technique that phishing scammers could potentially use to trick Internet users into visiting malicious websites. This phishing method takes advantage of the fact that characters from various languages and scripts are sometimes visually similar to each other. For example, the Cyrillic &ldquoа&rdquo and the ASCII &ldquoa&rdquo look virtually identical. This technique is known as a homograph attack. Homographic phishing efforts associated with IDNs are not new. In fact, they date back to the early 2000s. Registries have since implemented policies that preclude mixing scripts[1] within a domain name label . While this issue should be taken seriously and serves as an important reminder of consumer safety, various IDN and anti-abuse groups are actively working to mitigate potential threats, and there are already certain browser-set protections in place. In the meantime, Internet users should practice the same basic security hygiene that is always recommended: avoid clicking suspicious links, and use a good password manager that will only enter login credentials on trusted sites. Equally important is to recognize the benefits of IDNs and avoid disabling them, which could lead to an unpredictable user experience and eventually a decrease in adoption. IDNs are essential in bringing non-English speakers &ndash the majority of the world&rsquos population &ndash online, and allowing those users to create their own highly relevant online identities as well as navigate the Internet in their native languages. In addition to the social and cultural benefits of IDNs, they also represent a significant economic opportunity a recent report commissioned by the Universal Acceptance Steering Group (UASG) found that online spending from new IDN users could start at USD 6.2 billion per year. The UASG&rsquos mission is to help software developers and website owners keep pace with the evolving Domain Name System (DNS) &ndash and this includes issues around the adoption and acceptance of IDNs. If you&rsquod like to get involved in helping work toward a solution to this and other IDN-related issues, please visit https://uasg.tech/ or get in touch to learn more. [1] Exceptions are practiced for languages with established orthographies and conventions that require the commingled use of multiple scripts, e.g. the Japanese writing system . Do not Remove:[HID]20170425182821379[-HID]