[[--Translated text (en -> es)--]] Asunto: Re: Proyecto de mejoras de ALAC / At-Large - actualización importante A partir de: carlton.samuels@gmail.com Sí señor! En ambas cuestiones de fondo que recibe - y logró ampliar y aclarar - las preocupaciones que tengo. Ojalá me hubiera visto esto antes, así que podría haber salvado mis dedos con un "1 "....... Carlton ============================== Carlton A Samuels Móvil: 876-818-1799 * Estrategia, Planificación, Gobierno, Evaluación y plazos de entrega * ============================= El Mar, 11 de octubre 2011 a las 6:39 PM, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> escribió:

On 11 October 2011 19:04, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:

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Take imaginary example candidate A, ALAC member, does not attend calls, does not attend meetings, or when he travels, uses their time outside of the ALAC room. A does not get involved in ALAC & other working groups. A is basically using their affiliation to ALAC as something that looks good on their CV. Admittedly, this is an extreme, but Carlton, at the moment, nothing can be done about that person, and that imaginary person is occupying a seat on the ALAC, one of the only 15 seats of people supposed to act in the best interests of the 2.1Bn Internet users out there. That person is failing those 2.1Bn people. That person is not accountable.

I guess the big question -- at least MY big question -- is, accountable to who?

If that person was sent by a RALO, the RALO should be able to handle this issue through a recall or other similar measure.

If the person was appointed by the NomCom, the procedure is different but a mechanism is still required. By definition a NomCom ALAC appointee is not accountable to ALAC or the region, however it reflects badly on the NomCom and ICANN itself if non-performing ALAC members are chosen and allowed to under-serve for an entire two-year term.

What bothers me the most is the prospect of ALAC passing judgment over its own members. If a RALO elects someone who reflects their viewpoint, and that viewpoint is that only a small number of issues matter, this is indeed the RALO's choice to make and ALAC has no right to engage in top-down second-guessing. Education and persuasion, certainly, but not sanctions.

I fully agree on requesting that every RALO has some kind of recall mechanism for their elected officials -- not just ALAC members but also RALO chairs, secretariats and liaisons as applicable. Indeed I have long advocated this within my own RALO. I am also greatly in favour of staff's providing attendance and other performance metrics that allow a RALO to act appropriately on factual inputs. But I am very much against any scheme that has ALAC members being accountable to other ALAC members.

It's bad enough that the ICANN Board has no legal, fiduciary duty to the public, but only to ICANN itself. Let's not justify, let alone propagate that mistake within our own bounds.

But in any case, this debate is premature. We're at an intermediate

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stage, with more than 50 recommendations in this report, some of which are completed, some of which need to be taken to the next stage. The debate on sanctions/no sanctions will happen later.

I don't think there's any problem with that. As I've mentioned, it's simply that the wording in the report right now could easily be interpreted by a casual reader to infer that we have already had the discussion, agreed on a regime of sanctions, and are simply discussing appropriate implementation going forward. WE know the debate is incomplete, but that is not what the report indicates.

- Evan

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